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Sanctioning Qatar: Coercive interference in the State’s domaine réservé? 
On 23 May, the Qatar News Agency published content attributing statements to Qatar’s Emir 
which laid bare simmering regional sensitivities and quickly escalated into a full-blown 
diplomatic row between Qatar and other regional Powers.  
Indeed, on Monday 5 June, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt 
adopted what has been dubbed a ‘diplomatic and economic blockade’ (to the annoyance of 
some). Not only did these States close their land, naval and aerial borders for travel and 
transport to and from Qatar, the three Gulf States also appeared to expel Qatari diplomats and 
order (some) Qatari citizens to leave their territory within 14 days. In addition, websites from 
the Al Jazeera Media Network, as well as other Qatari newspapers, were blocked and offices 
were shut down in several countries. At the end of a feverish week, on Friday 9 June, targeted 
sanctions were furthermore adopted against Qatari organizations and nationals believed to have 
links to Islamist militancy. 
In justification of the measures, the sanctioning States invoked the Gulf Cooperation Council’s 
2013 Riyadh Agreement and its implementation mechanisms as well as the Comprehensive 
Agreement of 2014. Although the contents of these agreements are not public, it is believed that 
the Gulf States expected Qatar to curtail its support to groups that purportedly pose a threat to 
the region’s stability, such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. They would also have 
expected Qatar to restrict the media attention these groups are given by Qatari-based outlets 
like Al Jazeera (see here, here). However, given the scope of the measures against Qatar and 
the initial lack of clarity surrounding the allegations, the US State Department questioned 
whether: ‘the actions [were] really about their concerns regarding Qatar’s alleged support for 
terrorism, or were they about the long simmering grievances between and among the GCC 
countries?’  
Shortly afterwards, on 23 June, the Saudi-led quartet issued a list of 13 demands that Qatar is 
to implement within ten days. The Guardian reported that it requires Qatar to, inter alia: reduce 
its diplomatic ties with Iran; sever all ties to terrorist organisations; cease all funding provided 
by persons that have been designated as terrorists; cease all communication with opposition 
parties in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain; shut down Al-Jazeera, its affiliate stations 
and other news outlets that Qatar funds directly or indirectly; terminate Turkey’s military 
presence in Qatar and cease any joint military cooperation with Turkey; and that Qatar ‘align 
itself with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially and economically, 
as well as on economic matters, in line with an agreement reached with Saudi Arabia in 2014.’ 
The Saudi Foreign Minister stressed that the demands are non-negotiable while the UAE 
ambassador to Russia suggested that further sanctions would be considered if Qatar would 
refuse to comply. 
Qatar confirmed receipt of the list but has yet to formulate an official response.  However, 
describing the demands as unreasonable and non-actionable, the Qatari foreign minister 
reportedly stated that ‘the illegal blockade has nothing to do with combating terrorism, it is 
about limiting Qatar’s sovereignty, and outsourcing our foreign policy’. He further appeared to 
refer to a violation of the non-intervention principle when he asserted at the beginning of the 
crisis that: ‘Anything not related to [the affairs of the Gulf Cooperation Council] is not subject 
to negotiation. […] Al Jazeera is Qatar's affairs, Qatari foreign policy on regional issues is 
Qatar's affairs. And we are not going to negotiate on our own affairs’. 
In this regard, we can recall the ICJ’s well-known passage on the principle of non-intervention 
in the Nicaragua judgment:  ‘A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on 
matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. 
[…] Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which 
must remain free ones.’ The Court then adds that the element of coercion ‘forms the very 
essence of prohibited intervention’. Consequently, for the sanctions against Qatar to qualify as 
a violation of the principle they must (1) constitute coercive interference in (2) Qatar’s domaine 
réservé. 
Concerning the latter condition, if the goal of the sanctioning States it to pressure Qatar into 
ceasing its funding of terrorism and comply with its previous agreements under the scope of the 
GCC, then the measures would not interfere with Qatar’s sovereign rights. However, as 
indicated above the precise content of the Riyadh agreement is not known. Further, media 
outlets and experts of the region have described the crisis as a means for Saudi Arabia to impose 
its will on Qatar, who seeks to follow an ‘independent foreign policy’, and as an attempt to 
force Qatar to muzzle its ‘free media’, which often voices criticism against Saudi policies (see 
here, here, here and here);, such concerns have been repeatedly echoed in Qatar’s statements. 
If the Guardian’s report of the list of demands against Qatar is accurate, these suspicions would 
seem to be largely confirmed. In particular, the demand that Qatar ‘align itself with the other 
Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially and economically’ raises questions in 
this regard. Accordingly, as pursuing an autonomous foreign policy falls within Qatar’s 
domaine réservé (as indicated in UNGA Friendly Relations Declaration and the Nicaragua 
dictum above)  the Gulf States could be responsible for violating the principle of non-
intervention provided the measures amount to coercive interference, a term that has been 
notoriously difficult to interpret. 
In the Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ declared that coercion is ‘particularly obvious’ in the case 
of an intervention that uses force (ICJ Nicaragua case, para.205). Doctrine has also referred to 
‘dictatorial’ interference as being coercive, defined as state action ‘in effect depriving the state 
intervened against of control over the matter in question’ (Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim’s 
International Law (2008), para.129). This definition seems to align with the interpretation of 
coercion as something akin to force majeure by the International Law Commission in its 
commentary to Article 18 ARSIWA: ‘[n]othing less than conduct which forces the will of the 
coerced State will suffice, giving it no effective choice but to comply with the wishes of the 
coercing State’. According to this interpretation, the principle solely prohibits non-forcible 
interference that effectively results in the subordination of the will of the targeted State. 
Consequently, as Qatar has – for the time being – not given into the demands by the Saudi-led 
bloc and has indicated that it has the means to resist the pressure imposed upon it, no violation 
of the principle of non-intervention would have occurred. 
However, the ICJ clearly stipulated that intervention is wrongful when it ‘uses certain methods 
of coercion’ (ICJ Nicaragua case, para.205). Furthermore, the UNGA Friendly Relations 
Declaration states that ‘[n]o State may use or encourage the use of economic political or any 
other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of 
the exercise of its sovereign rights’. A review of the Declaration’s travaux préparatoires 
moreover suggests an alternative approach to non-forcible coercive interference that is, perhaps, 
more conceptually sound. Already in 1964, a representative in the Special Committee floated 
the idea that coercion entails ‘abnormal or improper pressure exercised by one State on another 
State in order to force it to change its internal structure in a direction favourable to the interests 
of the State applying such coercion’ (UN Doc. A/5746, 16 November 1964, para.242) – the 
phrase ‘abnormal or arbitrary form[s] of coercion’ was picked up by representatives in a later 
session as well (UN Doc. A/6230, 27 June 1966, para.309). Interestingly, another representative 
linked such pressure to the ‘general principle of law which condemned certain actions as 
“abuses of rights”’ even if the pressure resulted from the exercise of sovereign rights by the 
intervening State (UN Doc. A/5746, 16 November 1964, para.263).  
Following that line of thought, ‘abnormal’, ‘improper’ or ‘arbitrary’ interference arguably 
entails pressure resulting either from a violation of international law (e.g., an unlawful use of 
force or a violation of a bilateral agreement) or from a so-called abus de droit, i.e., the exercise 
of sovereign rights by the intervening State for the sole purpose of harming or damaging another 
State. It is, in particular, the second limb that might be applicable to situations such as the one 
under review: Even if we accept that the measures adopted by the Saudi-led bloc targeting Qatar 
fall within the exercise of their sovereign rights – by closing down the borders, planning to 
deport citizens, and choosing to cut all trade relations with a neighbouring State – , their legality 
could still be questioned as an abusive or mala fide (bad faith) interference in Qatari affairs (i.e., 
coercive); at least inasmuch as they are designed to inflict maximal damage upon Qatar for the 
purpose of compelling it into ‘align[ing] itself with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, 
politically, socially and economically’. After all, the non-intervention principle proclaims that 
‘armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the 
personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation 
of international law’. The principle therefore encompasses more than a mere restatement of the 
prohibition on the use of force and goes beyond outlawing support for armed rebel movements 
abroad. In this way, coercion does not necessarily amount to an irresistible pressure. This 
interpretation of non-forcible coercion would seem to correspond to developing States’ repeated 
condemnations of unilateral coercive measures as contrary to international law (see Alexandra 
Hofer, ‘The Developed/Developing Divide on Unilateral Coercive Measures: Legitimate 
Enforcement or Illegitimate Intervention?’ (2017) Chinese JIL).  
Perhaps such an interpretation adheres better to the principle’s ratio legis: to prohibit one State 
from intervening in the affairs of another, regardless of the means employed. Indeed, it would 
be illogical to present Qatar – or any other State in a similar situation – with a ‘no-win situation’: 
either it is able to resist the pressure, meaning no violation of the non-intervention principle 
occurs but it is forced to endure the resulting damage; or it is not able to resist, resulting in a 
prohibited intervention but forcing it to fold to the wishes of the intervening States.  
